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THE WITHERING OF OUR DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES:
FRAME V. CITY OF ARLINGTON AND WHY (FOR
Now?) THE ADA No LONGER REPRESENTS
THEIR FULL FLOWERING
Robert Quimby*
I. INTRODUCTION
Frame v. City of Arlington' evidences a disturbing trend to erode the
intended effectiveness of the American with Disabilities Act ("ADA"),
ironically at a time when many Americans need its protections the most.2
In Frame, disabled residents of the city of Arlington, Texas ("City"), sought
an injunction to force the City to bring over one hundred inaccessible
curbs, sidewalks, and parking facilities into compliance with the ADA. 3 In-
stead of finding a continuing violation or holding that the statute of limita-
tions began to accrue on the date the plaintiffs were actually injured, a
majority of the three judge panel held that the two-year statute of limita-
tions began running when the City completed construction or alteration of
any of the allegedly noncompliant curbs.' In reaching its conclusion, the
court applied reasoning from a case that predated the ADA and was distin-
guishable on key facts.'
By examining the remedial intent behind the ADA and case law re-
garding the application of the statute of limitations to remedial statutes,
this note will show that Frame should have either applied the continuing
violation theory or held that the statute of limitations could not begin ac-
cruing before the plaintiffs were actually injured. The Supreme Court
should overrule this decision or Congress should act to consistently avoid
results such as Frame. Fortunately, an examination of recent congressional
denunciation of claims similar to Frame seems to foreshadow such congres-
sional action.
* The author gratefully acknowledges the guidance of Professor Judith Johnson throughout the
drafting of this Note. This Note would not have materialized without her willingness to pass on her
knowledge of the subject matter and thoughtfully consider the issues raised herein. I also thank
Professor Donald Campbell for his encouragement in the early drafting stages. Lastly, I thank my wife,
Ashley, and my parents, James and Alice, for their unwavering support and encouragement in this and
all other endeavors.
1. Frame v. City of Arlington, 575 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2009).
2. See infra note 131.
3. Frame, 575 F.3d at 434.
4. Id.
5. See infra Section V, subsection B.
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 22, 2005, five disabled residents of the City filed suit against
the City under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.6 The residents, who
depend on motorized wheelchairs for mobility, alleged that more than one
hundred curbs and poorly maintained sidewalks in the City made their
travel impossible or unsafe and that at least three public parking facilities
lacked adequate handicap parking.' Therefore, the residents sought an in-
junction requiring the City to bring its curbs, sidewalks, and parking lots
into compliance with the ADA.'
The City moved to dismiss the residents' complaint on the grounds
that the claims were barred by the applicable two-year statute of limita-
tions.9 The district court held that the residents' claims accrued on the date
the City completed the construction or alteration of any noncompliant
curb, sidewalk, or parking lot.10 Because the residents' complaint did not
point to dates of noncompliant construction or alteration within the two
years before the filing date, the district court granted the City's motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that the residents' claims were barred
by the applicable two-year statute of limitations."
The residents appealed the dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit.12 Faced with issues of first impression within the circuit,
the majority of a three-judge panel found that the district court correctly
held that the plaintiffs' claims were subject to a two-year statute of limita-
tions, which began running when the City completed any noncompliant
construction or alteration." However, the dissenting judge disagreed with
the majority regarding the date the statute of limitations began to accrue
because he felt the majority's holding "ignore[d] the plain text of the stat-
ute, fail[ed] to acknowledge the conflict it create[d] with traditional rules of
standing, and create[d] a rule at odds with the ADA's broad remedial pur-
pose."1 4 To avoid those conflicts and comply with purpose of the ADA, the
6. Frame, 575 F.3d at 434. The ADA prohibits public entities from discriminating on the basis
of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2010). The Rehabilitation Act prohibits recipients of federal funding
from discriminating against persons on the basis of disability. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2010).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. The City also moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked
standing under either Title II of the ADA or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and that the alleged
facts did not state a legal claim of discrimination. Id. The court's disposition regarding these grounds is
briefly discussed in infra Section IV, subsection A, though they are not the focus of this Note.
10. Id.
11. Id. The district court also noted that Frame has filed 14 lawsuits under the ADA in the past 5
years and stated that it "is growing weary of Frame's ADA grievances." Order Granting Third Re-
newed Mot. To Dismiss at 2, Frame v. City of Arlington, No. 4-05CV-470-Y (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2008).
The fact that this statement suggests the district court had its mind made up before hearing the facts is
worth noting, though it is not discussed further in this note.
12. Id. at 433.
13. Id. The court's ultimate holding was to vacate and remand the dismissal because it found the
district court erred in placing the burden of proving accrual on the plaintiffs. Id. at 441. However, this
Note's primary focus is on the court's affirmation that the two-year statute of limitations began accruing
when any noncompliant facilities were constructed or altered.
14. Id. at 441 (Prado, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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dissenting judge concluded the better approach would have been to hold
that a plaintiff's cause of action accrues when he or she suffers an actual
injury under the Act - that is, when the plaintiff is actually unable to access
the noncompliant facility."
III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
A. The American with Disabilities Act of 1990
On July 26, 1990, President George H. W. Bush signed the American
with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("Act"), which comprehensively prohibited
discrimination on the basis of disability.1 6 Upon signing the Act, President
Bush stated that the broad scope of the Act was necessary because "the
barriers faced by individuals with disabilities are wide-ranging,"" and that
the Act therefore "promises to open up all aspects of American life to indi-
viduals with disabilities[.]""s President Bush also stated that "[i]t is alto-
gether fitting that the American people have once again given clear
expression to our most basic ideals of freedom and equality. The American
with Disabilities Act represents the full flowering of our democratic
principles[.]" 19
The President's remarks were well reflective of congressional intent;
Congress found that "historically, society has tended to isolate and segre-
gate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such
forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a
serious and pervasive social problem."2 0 With that in mind, Congress an-
nounced the purpose of the ADA is "to provide clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with
15. Id. at 442.
16. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat 327 (current
version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 -12213 (2010)). Title II of the Act reads as follows: "Subject to the
provisions of this title, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a
public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2010).
17. "Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing S. 993" 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1165 (July 30, 1990) (as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 601, 601).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2010). § 12101, which outlines the findings of Congress and the
purpose of the ADA, reads as follows:
(a) Findings
The Congress finds that -
(1) physical or mental disabilities in no way diminish a person's right to fully participate
in all aspects of society, yet many people with physical or mental disabilities have been
precluded from doing so because of discrimination ...
(3) discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as ...
public accommodations . ..
(4) unlike individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of race, color,
sex, national origin, religion, or age, individuals who have experienced discrimination on
the basis of disability have often had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination;
(5) individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, in-
cluding . . . the discriminatory effects of . . . failure to make modifications to existing
facilities . ..
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disabilities[.]"21  To achieve its goals, Title II of the Act explicitly provides
that local and state governments are required to install curb cuts on public
streets.2 2 The Act further states as follows:
[e]ach facility or part of a facility altered ... for the use of a
public entity in a manner that affects or could affect the us-
ability of the facility or part of the facility shall, to the maxi-
mum extent feasible, be altered in such manner that the
altered portion of the facility is readily accessible to and us-
able by individuals with disabilities, if the alteration was
commenced after January 26, 1992.23
Congress also stated that Title II should be interpreted consistent with
other Titles of the Act, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Alexander v.
Choate.24 In Choate, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that § 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act should prohibit discriminatory architectural barriers be-
cause congressional findings and statements regarding the need to ban such
barriers "would ring hollow if the resulting legislation could not rectify the
harms resulting from action that discriminated by effect[.]" 25
B. Prior Supreme Court Case Law's Clouding Effect upon the Judicial
Determination of Accrual Dates for Statute of Limitations
in ADA and Similar Claims
The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged the congres-
sional intent for the ADA to be a broad, sweeping mandate. 26  Addition-
ally, soon after the enactment of the ADA, the Supreme Court explicitly
reiterated the soundness of the general rule announced in 1946 that when:
(6) census data, national polls, and other studies have documented that people with disa-
bilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are severely disadvan-
taged ...
(7) the Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality
of opportunity [and] full participation . . .
(8) the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice de-
nies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue
those opportunities for which our free society is justifiably famous ...
(b) Purpose
It is the purpose of this Act -
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities ...
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the standards
established in this Act on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority . .. in order to address the major areas
of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (2010).
22. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11) at 367.
23. 28 C.F.R. § 35.151 (1991).
24. 469 U.S. 287 (1985). See supra note 22.
25. Choate, 469 U.S. at 297.
26. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 675 (2001) ("In the ADA, Congress provided that
broad mandate [that discrimination against disabled people should be eliminated]. In fact, one of the
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federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the
rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust
their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief. And it is
also well settled that where ... a federal statute provides for
a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may
use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.27
The continuing violation theory, which rescues a plaintiff's claim from the
statute of limitations because the defendant's continuing misconduct justi-
fies doing so, is one tool courts use to achieve the above remedial princi-
ples.2 8 The Supreme Court has narrowly confined the application of the
continuing violation theory to exclude its use in instances that involve iso-
lated, easily identifiable acts,2 9 in large part because it is clear the plaintiffs
in such suits are notified of their claim when the act occurred.3 0
In cases such as Frame, however, the identification of when the plain-
tiff is notified of his or her potential claim is more problematic, which bol-
sters the case for applying the continuing violation theory. The following
cases decided prior to the enactment of the ADA have severely clouded
courts' determination of the applicable accrual date for statute of limita-
tions purposes in cases such as Frame where the date of notice is not easily
identifiable.
1. Del. State Coil. v. Ricks,3' Chardon v. Fernandez,32 and Lorance v.
AT&T Tech., Inc. 3 3
The reasoning that the majority in Frame relied upon in determining
the statute of limitations issue - that the proper focus for accrual purposes
is on the discriminatory act, not the discovery of the discriminatory effect -
was first announced by the United States Supreme Court in 1980 in Del.
State Coll. v. Ricks.34 In Ricks, which was a Title VII employment discrimi-
nation suit, the Court was faced with deciding whether the statute of limita-
tions began running when the plaintiff was officially notified he would be
Act's 'most impressive strengths' has been identified as its 'comprehensive character.'") (internal cita-
tions omitted).
27. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (reaffirmed by Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch.,
503 U.S. 60 (1992)).
28. Kyle Graham, The Continuing Violations Doctrine, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 271, 272-73 (2008).
While this definition seems straightforward, "[c]ourts have failed to develop a coherent test for distin-
guishing continuing violations from claims governed by other accrual and tolling rules. Without excep-
tion, the methodologies that have been produced offer little help to judges and litigants. The[]
prevailing approaches are framed in vague and generic terms, often fail to identify themselves as tests
of limited or general applicability .. . ,and universally cannot be squared with how courts actually apply
... the doctrine." Id. at 283-84.
29. See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002).
30. See, e.g., Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980), discussed infra.
31. 449 U.S. 250 (1980).
32. 454 U.S. 6 (1981).
33. 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
34. Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980) (citing Abramson v. Univ. of Haw., 594
F.2d 202, 209 (9th Cir. 1979)).
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offered a "terminal contract" or whether it began running when the con-
tract expired.3 5 The Court determined the former was appropriate, and
Rick's claim was time-barred because the only alleged discrimination oc-
curred when Rick's tenure determination was made and communicated to
him.3 6 To the Court, Rick's abundant forewarning of his employer's deci-
sion justified the shorter limitations period, even though it "recognize[d],
of course, that the limitations periods should not commence to run so soon
that it becomes difficult for a layman to invoke the protection of the civil
rights statutes." 37
The next year in Chardon v. Fernandez a majority of the Court reaf-
firmed its reasoning in Ricks. 8 This time, however, three justices vigor-
ously dissented from the "particularly ill-conceived" result. 39  As one
dissenter pointed out, Ricks and Chardon were analytically distinct with
regards to the interplay between the timing of statutory injury and notice.4 0
Ricks was notified of the discriminatory act (which comprised the alleged
injury) precisely when it occurred, 4 1 but "it is quite another to hold, as the
Court does here, that a cause of action for damages resulting from an un-
constitutional termination of employment accrues when the plaintiff learns
that he will be terminated." 42 Furthermore, the dissenters noted that the
majority's decision would increase the number of claims in the federal
courts that are "unripe" and "anticipatory," and opined that claims should
instead be filed after some "concrete" harm is suffered. 43 Lastly, the dis-
senters cogently concluded "[n]o actual harm is done until the threatened
action is consummated. Until then, the act which is the central focus of the
plaintiffs' claim remains incomplete. Such was not the situation in Ricks,
where the denial of tenure was itself the completed act being challenged." 4 4
In Lorance v. AT&T Tech., Inc., the plaintiffs contended that the se-
niority system at their work was altered to protect male workers by dis-
couraging the promotion of women.4 5 Citing Ricks, in addition to the
special treatment afforded to seniority systems, the majority determined
there was no continuing violation, and the limitations period began to run
35. Id. at 255.
36. Id. at 259.
37. Id. at 262 n.16.
38. Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981).
39. Id. at 9 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
40. Id.
41. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258.
42. Chardon, 454 U.S. at 9 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
43. Id. See also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494-97 (1974) ("It must be alleged that the
plaintiff has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of the
challenged statute . . . . The injury or threat of injury must be both real and immediate, not conjectural
or hypothetical . . . . [A]ttempting to anticipate whether and when these respondents will be [able to
state a claim in the future] takes us into the area of speculation and conjecture . . . . [W]e doubt that
there is sufficient immediacy and reality to respondents' allegations of future injury to warrant invoca-
tion of the jurisdiction of the District Court.") (internal citations omitted).
44. Chardon, 454 U.S. at 13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45. Lorance v. AT&T Tech., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 903 (1989).
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when the system was adopted.46 Dissenters chastised the majority's contin-
ued application of Ricks to a case that differs on key facts. 47 The dissenters
reiterated many of the problematic issues caused by the majority's holding
that were elucidated in the dissents in Chardon. Specifically, they came
back to the anticipatory nature required under the majority's decision: "the
harsh reality of today's decision requir[es] employees to sue anticipatorily
or forever hold their peace, [which is] so glaringly at odds with the pur-
poses of Title VII[.]"4 8 The dissenters also distinguished the case from
Ricks as it pertained to notice; there was no indication that any employee
was so affected by the new plan as to create an incentive to sue, whereas in
Ricks the employee affected knew the impact it would have on him.49
The dissenters further predicted the majority's result would come as a
surprise to Congress, which presumably did not intend to grant discrimina-
torily adopted seniority systems immunity as long as they survived their
first three hundred days.so Thus, they concluded their dissent by noting the
"increasingly hollow ring" to the Court's pronouncement that limitations
periods should not begin to run so early as to make it difficult for a layman
to seek the remedies provided by the civil rights statutes. Congress
agreed with them and legislatively reversed Lorance by amending § 112 in
the 1991 Civil Rights Act to allow employees to challenge a seniority sys-
tem not only when the system was adopted, but also "when a person ag-
grieved is injured by the application of the seniority system[.]" 5 2
The Supreme Court implicitly adopted the reasoning of the dissenters
in Chardon and Lorance in Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension
Trust Fund v. Ferber." In that case, the Court rejected the appellate
court's determination that, in an action brought by a pension plan for re-
covery of unpaid withdrawals, the statute of limitations runs from the date
the employer withdraws from the plan - arguably the date of the discrimi-
natory act - rather than the first date a scheduled payment was missed (and
the discriminatory effects became apparent).5 4 The Court's reasoning was
that, "on [the Court of Appeals'] view, the limitations period commences at
a time when the plan could not yet file suit. Such a result is inconsistent
with basic limitations principles . . . [because] the plaintiff has [to have] a
complete and present cause of action." 5  Other courts have justified Bay
Area's reasoning by pointing out such a result makes sense given that a
46. Id. at 911.
47. Id. at 913-199 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 914.
49. Id. at 918-19.
50. Id. at 914 ("This severe interpretation of § 706(e) will come as a surprise to Congress, whose
goals in enacting Title VII surely never included conferring absolute immunity on discriminatorily
adopted seniority systems that survive their first 300 days.").
51. Id. at 919.
52. Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1302, 1305 n.11 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
53. 522 U.S. 192 (1997).
54. Id. at 200-01.
55. Id.
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requirement for standing under Article III is concrete and particularized
injury in fact.5 6
2. Havens Realty Corp. v. Colemans7 as an Outlier to the Above
Analysis
Between Chardon and Lorance, the Court decided Havens Realty
Corp. v. Coleman, in which the plaintiffs alleged the defendants violated
the Fair Housing Act of 1968 ("FHA") because the defendants allegedly
practiced racial steering.58 Ignoring its prior holdings, the Court decided
not to apply the applicable 180-day statute of limitations." Instead, the
Court applied the continuing violation theory, noting that the intention for
statutes of limitations to keep stale claims out of the courts is of no concern
when the alleged violation is a continuing one. 6 0 Additionally, to hold oth-
erwise would have cut against the broad remedial effect Congress intended
the FHA to have.61 Thus, according to the Court, "where a plaintiff ...
challenges not just one incident of conduct violative of the Act, but an un-
lawful practice that continues into the limitations period, the complaint is
timely when it is filed within 180 days of the last asserted occurrence of that
practice."6 2
3. The Effect of the Above Conflicting Analyses on Later Courts'
Determinations of ADA and Similar Cases
The following cases highlight the varying and conflicting nature in
which courts have applied the above referenced case law in ADA and simi-
lar suits involving other statues designed to eliminate discrimination.6 3
Some follow the majority's reasoning in Ricks and Chardon, while others
either take the dissenting Justices' approach and find factual distinctions or
apply the continuing violation theory.
In 1999, the Northern District of Ohio decided Deck v. City of To-
ledo6 4 and adopted the reasoning from Havens. The plaintiffs in Deck were
disabled persons who relied upon motorized wheelchairs for transporta-
tion.65 They brought suit seeking to bring the streets and sidewalks into
56. See, e.g., S.D. v. Access 4 All, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 2d 160 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
57. 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
58. Id. at 368.
59. Id. at 380-81.
60. Id. at 380.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 380-81.
63. See, e.g., Toney v. U.S. Healthcare, 840 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1993). (The plaintiff alleged a
doctor denied him service because of his disability. With regard to the accrual date of the applicable
statute of limitations, the court cited Chardon for the proposition that the concern was with the date of
the discriminatory act, not when the consequences of that act became apparent. Notwithstanding that
citation, however, the court stated that a claim accrues, and the applicable statute of limitations begins
to run, when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of her injury and held that the statute of limita-
tions began to run when the doctor informed the plaintiff he would not be treated because of his HIV
status).
64. 56 F. Supp. 2d 886 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
65. Id. at 888.
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compliance with the ADA.6 6 Toledo moved for partial summary judgment,
alleging that the statute of limitations had run.67 Deck offered a conflicting
analysis on when the claim accrued for statute of limitation purposes.
While it stated, "[o]f course, 'the limitations period is measured beginning
only from the time when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the
injury,"' 6 8 it nonetheless concluded that the statute of limitations was trig-
gered when the alleged discriminatory act occurred. 69
The court allowed the plaintiffs' case to continue, however, by finding
a continuing violation.70 The court cited Havens for the proposition that
staleness concerns disappear when the alleged violation is a continuing
one. Specifically, the court applied a category of continuing violations
that occurred as a result of "a longstanding" and "over-arching policy of
discrimination."72 The court determined that the continuing violation the-
ory applied because the plaintiffs were not complaining of "individual, un-
related discreet events," or "'passive inaction' of a 'continuing ill effect.' ""
While the court did admit that determining whether the failure to install
curb cuts amounted to a continuing violation of the ADA was "somewhat
arduous," it concluded that Toledo's "benign neglect in the oversight of
curb ramp construction creates an adverse impact on disabled individuals
who live or frequently travel within Toledo."74
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially followed Toledo's
reasoning. In 2002, the Ninth Circuit decided Pickern v. Holiday Quality
Foods Inc.,7 5 in which the plaintiff sought injunctive relief because a store
did not have adequate access to and from the parking lot, among other
things.76 The court held the plaintiff's complaint was not time-barred be-
cause, "under the ADA, once a plaintiff has actually become aware of dis-
criminatory conditions existing at a public accommodation, and is thereby
deterred from visiting or patronizing that accommodation, the plaintiff has
suffered an injury."" "So long as the discriminatory conditions continue,"
the court elaborated, "and so long as a plaintiff is aware of them and re-
mains deterred, the injury under the ADA continues."78 The court reached
its conclusion that the ADA clearly makes a continuing violation of the
ADA an injury within its meaning because it affords injunctive relief to
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 892 (citing Stewart v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 679 F.2d 117, 120 (7th Cir. 1982)).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 895.
71. Id. at 892.
72. Id. at 893.
73. Id. (citing Tolbert v. Ohio Dep't. of Transp. 172 F.3d 934, 940 (6th Cir. 1999)). The court also
cited Schonfeld v. City of Carlsbad, 978 F. Supp. 1329 (S.D. Cal. 1997), for the same rationale regarding
the existence of a continuing violation. Id. at 894.
74. Id. at 895.
75. 293 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2002).
76. Id. at 1136.
77. Id. at 1136-37.
78. Id. at 1137.
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"any person who is being subjected to discrimination on the basis of disabil-
ity," 79 in addition to the fact that Congress sought to avoid unreasonable
burdens on ADA plaintiffs.so
Six years later, however, the Ninth Circuit completely reversed its
stance regarding the statute of limitations in civil rights suits when it
reheard Garcia v. Brockway" en banc. In Garcia, the disabled plaintiff
contended that the apartment she rented failed to comply with the FHA.8 2
The court followed the reasoning from Ricks and held that the statute of
limitations did apply, barring the plaintiff's claim, because the discrimina-
tory act - the building of the apartments in 1993 - was the point of accrual,
and when the effects of that act affected the plaintiff did not matter. In
finding so, the majority gave strong deference to the policy behind the stat-
ute of limitations, noting that "[w]ere we to now hold the contrary, the
FHA's statute of limitations would provide little finality for
developers[.]" 84
The decision in Garcia was met with two lengthy and vigorous dis-
sents, the first of which found "the majority's decision well illustrates how
statutes of limitations have been twisted by courts to limit the scope and
thrust of civil rights laws."" The dissenters initially noted the fact that the
majority's approach gives developers complete immunity from suit two
years after the certificate of completion is issued, regardless of the fact that
a disabled person may be the first to know or have reason to know of fail-
ure to comply with the FHA outside of initial two years. 86 The dissenting
judges believed that Congress intended quite the opposite; that is, they be-
lieved a disabled person injured by a developer's violation of the FHA
should be able to sue within two years of his or her injury.8 7
The dissenters also noted that, "[i]ronically, by invoking provisions
Congress inserted into the FHA to expand disabled persons' access to the
courts and to facilitate private enforcement, the majority transforms a stat-
ute of limitations into a highly unusual statute of repose for the benefit of
real estate developers and landlords." 8  The dissenters also pointed out
that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff actu-
ally experiences the discrimination and that developers could share expo-
sure through contractual rights to indemnity when selling houses that
violate the FHA.8 9 Lastly, the concern over hearing the case while relevant
79. Id. at 1136 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (2010)) (emphasis in original).
80. Id.
81. 526 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2008).
82. Id. at 459.
83. Id. at 459-62.
84. Id. at 463.
85. Id. at 466 (Pregerson, J., and Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 466-67.
87. Id. at 467.
88. Id. at 468 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 473, 477 (upholding the "general rule that statutes of limitations are not triggered at
least until a plaintiffs cause of action has accrued." Garcia, 526 F.3d at 473 (Fisher, J., dissenting); and
suggesting as policy that "developers might seek to shift or share their exposure through contractual
456 [VOL. 29:447
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evidence is still available is nonexistent because developers' intent does not
matter - "defendant's architectural plans and apartment complexes can
themselves speak to the alleged construction violations."90
In HIP (Heightened Independence and Progress), Inc. v. Port Auth. of
N. Y and N.J.,91 the court reached the same result as the court in Pickern
and found a continuing violation of the ADA when the Port Authority
failed to make a public transportation station accessible to disabled per-
sons.92 Because "[t]he general rule is that the statute of limitations begins
to run as soon as a right to institute and maintain suit arises," the court
reasoned, "[p]laintiffs' ADA cause of action accrued when they knew, or
had reason to know, of the injury that is the basis of the action."" Addi-
tionally, the court noted that the beginning of the defendant's duty - and
when that duty is "breached by. . . a discriminatory act. . . is [analytically]
distinct from. . . when a plaintiff's. . . cause of action begins to accrue."9
Thus, the accrual date for the plaintiffs' ADA claim did not automatically
begin to run on the date the new entrance opened. Rather, the date the
claim began accruing was the date the plaintiffs knew or should have
known of the station's inaccessible entrance, and the defendant had not
proved that the plaintiffs knew or should have known the entrance was
inaccessible the day it opened.96
The court also discussed three factors to consider when analyzing
whether or not a continuing violation exists, all of which favored the plain-
tiff: (1) whether the violations are connected because they are all the same
type of discrimination; (2) whether the violations are isolated or recurrent;
and (3) the permanent nature of the violations (that is, even in the absence
of intent, would the consequences of the violations continue). 97
IV. INSTANT CASE
A. Circuit Judge Jolly's Majority Opinion
Judge Jolly delivered the opinion of the Court in Frame v. City of Ar-
lington, joined by Judge Southwick and, in part, by Judge Prado. The
Court first held that Title II of the ADA authorized the plaintiffs' claims, as
the City's curbs, sidewalks, and parking lots fell within the meaning of a
"service, program, or activity" in Title 11.98 Second, the Court held that the
provisions when they sell dwellings under which the new owners would indemnify the developers
against any suits brought under § 3604." Id. at 477).
90. Id. at 477 (quoting Silver State Fair Housing Council, Inc. v. ERGS, Inc., 362 F.Supp. 2d
1218, 1222 n. 1 (D.Nev. 2005)).
91. No. 2:07cv02982(JAG), 2008 WL 852445 (D.N.J. Mar.28, 2008).
92. Id. at *1, *3.
93. Id. at *3 (citing Burkhart v. Widener Univ., Inc., 70 F. App'x 52,53 (3d Cir. 2003)).
94. Id. at *4 (citing Voices for Independence (VFI) v. Penn. Dept. of Trans., No. 06-78 Erie, 2007
WL 2905887, at *13 (W.D.Pa. Sept. 28, 2007)).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at *3 (citing VFI, 2007 WL 2905887, at *4 (W.D.Pa. Sept. 28, 2007)).
98. Frame, 575 F.3d at 433.
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plaintiffs' claims were subject to a two-year statute of limitations that ac-
crued when the City completed any noncompliant construction or altera-
tion." The Court based its second holding on the fact that the alleged
violations were not latent, and it gave strong deference to the policies un-
derlying the statute of limitations. 00 However, the Court also concluded
that the burden was on the City to prove the accrual and expiration of the
limitations period."o'
The opinion first addressed whether the City's curbs, sidewalks, and
parking lots were a "service, program, or activity" within the meaning of
Title 11.102 After discussing the policy behind the ADA, specifically Title
11,103 the Court noted its sister circuits have broadly interpreted "services,
programs, or activities" to include public sidewalks because cities maintain
them.'04 While explicitly declining to go as far as the Ninth Circuit and
hold that "services, programs, or activities" include "anything a public en-
tity does," the Court determined that the language encompassed curbs,
sidewalks, and parking lots due to the plain meaning of "service," which
included a "facility supplying some public demand." 0 ' Lastly, the Court
noted its interpretation of "services, programs, or activities" was harmoni-
ous with legislative history.1 0 6
The Court then turned to the issue of when the applicable two-year
statute of limitations began to run.' The plaintiffs' contended that their
claims accrued on the date they encountered a noncompliant barrier and,
in the alternative, that their claims were not subject to the statute of limita-
tions because they only sought injunctive relief and the noncompliant
99. Id.
100. Id. at 440.
101. Id. at 433.
102. Id. at 435.
103. Id. (holding "[t]he ADA was passed '[t]o provide a clear and comprehensive national man-
date for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.' 42 U.S.C.
§12101(b)(1)[,]". . .while, "Title II provides that 'no qualified individual with a disability shall, by rea-
son of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, pro-
grams, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.'42 U.S.C.
§ 12132.").
104. Frame, 575 F.3d at 436. (noting that the Ninth, Sixth, Second, and Third Circuit Courts of
Appeals have interpreted "services, programs, or activities" very broadly as well See, e.g. Barden v.
City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002), Yeskey v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 118 F.3d 168, 171
(3d Cir. 1997) (holding that "services, programs, or activities" to be "anything a public entity does.");
see also Johnson v. City of Saline, 151 F.3d 564, 569 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that "the phrase 'services,
programs, or activities' encompasses virtually everything that a public entity does."), Innovative Health
Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 44 (2d Cir. 1997) (referring to "services, programs, or
activities" as "a catch-all phrase that prohibits all discrimination by a public entity, regardless of
context.")).
105. Frame, 575 F.3d at 436-37.
106. Id. at 437 (citing the legislative history: "[t]he employment, transportation, and public accom-
modation sections of [the ADA] would be meaningless if people who use wheelchairs were not afforded
the opportunity to travel on and between the streets.") (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 84
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 367).
107. Frame, 575 F.3d at 437.
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curbs, sidewalks, and parking lots were continuing violations of the
ADA.108
The Court swiftly rejected the plaintiffs' argument that their claims
were not subject to the statute of limitations.109 The Court noted that other
courts - including the U.S. Supreme Court - routinely applied statutes of
limitations to Title III claims, for which injunctive relief was the only rem-
edy available, and reasoned that Title II claims should not be treated differ-
ently.' The Court also dismissed the contention that the noncompliant
curbs, sidewalks, and parking lots were continuing violations of the ADA
because the alleged violations were not related, and holding so would be
inconsistent with its ultimate disposition of the case.
Next, the majority addressed the main issue on appeal: whether the
plaintiffs' claims accrued on the date they encountered a noncompliant bar-
rier (which would be an application of the discovery rule) or on the date
the City completed any noncompliant construction or alteration.112 The
Court sided with the City and adopted the latter approach, drawing a dis-
tinction between the discriminatory act and discovery of the discriminatory
effect.113 The Court noted that the United States Supreme Court only ap-
plied the discovery rule when medical malpractice and fraud - which are
both latent in that often their injuries cannot be discovered until some time
after the injurious act - are alleged." 4 As noncompliant sidewalks and
curbs are distinguishable from fraud or medical malpractice in that they are
not "hidden" or "concealed" from potential plaintiffs, the Court reasoned
the discovery rule should not apply."' The Court also distinguished the
plaintiffs' claims from employment discrimination cases under the ADA, to
which the Court applies the discovery rule, because in employment dis-
crimination cases the discovery and alleged discriminatory act occur at the
116same time.
Lastly, the Court underscored the policy behind the statute of limita-
tions to protect defendants from old claims. The Court endorsed the City's
argument and concluded that: "the effect [of applying the discovery rule]
would be an evisceration of the statute of limitations defense . . . and un-
limited exposure to liability. We think the wiser, more reasonable, and ...
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 438 (citing Gaona v. Town & Country Credit, 324 F.3d 1050, 1054-56 (8th Cir. 2003);
Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods, Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1136 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2002); Sexton v. Otis Coll. of
Art & Design Bd. of Directors, 129 F.3d 127, 127 (9th Cir. 1997); Soignier v. Am. Bd. of Plastic Surgery,
92 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1093 (1997); Walker v. Epps, 550 F.3d 407, 414 (5th
Cir. 2008)).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 439.
114. Id. at 439-40. (citing TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 27 (2001)).
115. Id.
116. Id.
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just approach, is a rule under which a public entity is liable for noncomp-
liant construction or alteration, but only during a definite and single limita-
tions period."" 7
However, the Court also determined that the City had the burden to
establish the expiration of the limitations period."18 The Court reached this
result because of the fact that a party who asserts an affirmative defense
bears the burden of proof, and, and as a practical matter, the City was in
the best position to prove accrual. The plaintiffs could not have proved
accrual without engaging in discovery with the City." 9
B. Circuit Judge Prado's Concurrence in Part and Dissent in Part
Judge Prado concurred with the majority in its determination that Title
II authorized the plaintiffs' claims, but he "conclude[d] that the better rule
- and the one that best comports with the text and purpose of the ADA - is
that a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff suffers an injury under the
Act based on that plaintiff's actual (as opposed to conjectural) inability to
traverse the noncompliant sidewalk or other facility."' 20 To Judge Prado,
the core of the issue was that generally a plaintiff's claim accrued when she
suffered an injury, and, according to Title II, the plaintiffs' injury occurred
when they actually suffered exclusion from the sidewalks, curbs, and park-
ing lots.121 The statute in question 22 focused on the exclusion from or de-
nial of the benefits of services, programs, or activities, and "a particular
disabled person would not suffer an injury in fact until he or she encounters
that discriminatory exclusion or denial. Simply put, there cannot be an in-
jury under the ADA until the plaintiff actually suffers the exclusion or de-
nial that the statute prohibits."123
Additionally, Judge Prado felt there was no reason to stray from the
general rule for claim accrual (requiring injury in fact), especially consider-
ing the majority "wholly ignores both the policies underlying the ADA and
the consequences of its decision."124 Judge Prado elaborated on the policy
behind the ADA, noting: "Congress enacted the ADA 'to provide a clear
and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities[,]' and 'the employment, transportation,
117. Id. at 440-41.
118. Id. at 441.
119. Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 8) (2010).
120. Id. at 442 (Prado, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
121. Id. (continuing: "A plaintiff does not have a complete and present cause of action and cannot
file suit and obtain relief until, inter alia, he or she has standing, which in turn requires the plaintiff to
suffer an 'injury in fact. . .' Thus, an essential question (and one I think the majority overlooks) is when
these particular plaintiffs suffered an injury in fact." (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560 (1992). Frame, 575 F.3d at 443 (Prado, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
122. Id. ("The provision at issue, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, provides that 'no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits
of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity."').
123. Id. at 443.
124. Id. at 447.
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and public accommodation sections of this Act would be meaningless if
people who use wheelchairs were not afforded the opportunity to travel on
and between the streets."12 5 The majority's holding cuts against this
"sweeping remedial purpose," Judge Prado reasoned because, "[i]n es-
sence, the City can avoid all liability and maintain noncompliant sidewalks
if it successfully avoids a lawsuit for two years after completing the con-
struction or alteration[, while a] newly disabled person, or a disabled per-
son who just moves to the City, would have no recourse but to suffer
through the ADA violation." 126
Judge Prado acknowledged the policy considerations that underlie the
statute of limitations, but he offered two facts that favor the plaintiffs in the
case at hand.12 7 First, in line with his lengthy discussion about injury in fact
being a prerequisite to the ability to file suit, Judge Prado reasoned "[a]
statute of limitations should not . . . cut off a plaintiffs ability to redress a
new injury to that plaintiff."128 Second, the City would not be liable for-
ever and could have avoided this litigation and all future liability by fixing
the noncompliant construction or alteration.129
Thus, Judge Prado concluded that the analysis of when a plaintiff actu-
ally suffers an injury and the text and purposes behind the ADA meant the
correct decision would have been to allow the plaintiff to bring suit within
two years of their injury. That is, the plaintiffs should have been allowed to
bring suit within two years of being unable to access or deterred from ac-
cessing a noncompliant sidewalk, curb, or parking lot.130
V. ANALYSIS
The majority's decision in Frame to apply the reasoning of Ricks and
Chardon is ill-conceived for many reasons, and it sets bad precedent at a
time when similar claims are beginning to rise with more frequency as our
infrastructure ages.' The holding in Frame regarding the accrual date for
the statute of limitations is as blatantly contrary to congressional intent as
the holding in Lorance, and, hopefully, as it did after Lorance, Congress
will amend the ADA to preclude the result reached in Frame.32
125. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, at 84 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
367).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 448.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 449.
131. See, e.g., Chris Joyner, Suit Calls for Jackson Compliance: Public Areas Called Impassable for
People with Wheelchairs, Clarion Ledger, Oct. 27, 2009, at Al (discussing a suit recently filed in Jack-
son, Miss. to bring curb cuts into compliance with the ADA and noting similar suits in Cal., Mo., Tenn.,
and Tex.).
132. See supra Part III, B, 1. At the time of this note's publication, a petition for rehearing en
banc has not yet been granted or denied. Hopefully, the court will rehear the case and reverse its prior
holding. The outcome of that petition and possible rehearing, however, does not affect the need for
consistency this note highlights or its hopeful prediction that Congress, absent action by the Supreme
Court, will amend the ADA to prevent results like Frame in the future.
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Subsection A of this analysis will highlight why an application of the
continuing violation theory would facilitate the clear intent of Congress
and allow plaintiffs such as Frame to defeat asserted defenses that their
claims fall outside of the applicable statute of limitations. Subsection B will
underscore the fact that, even if the continuing violation theory would not
apply in a situation such as Frame, Ricks and Chardon are distinguishable
on key facts. The correct approach, therefore, requires plaintiffs to be ac-
tually injured before the statute of limitations begins to run. Lastly, Sub-
section C will prove congressional disfavor of results such as the one
reached in Frame and why recent legislation hopefully foreshadows a legis-
lative reversal of such cases as Frame.
A. Havens and why the continuing violations doctrine should have been
adopted in Frame to better comport with congressional intent
In Frame, the majority's discussion of the continuing violation theory
is brief and conclusory. Its reasoning for not applying the doctrine was that:
[tihe continuing violations doctrine, which typically arises in
the context of employment discrimination, relieves a plain-
tiff of a limitations bar if he can show a series of related acts
to him .... We hesitate to extend that doctrine here, where
the alleged violations are not related. A noncompliant curb,
for instance, bears no relation to a noncompliant parking lot
on the other side of the City.'3 3
The majority could not be more wrong, however. Noncompliant curbs on
either side of the City are most certainly related - they make the whole
class of disabled persons who rely upon them unable to access that much
more of the City, which makes the case for systemic discrimination that
much stronger. The only other discussion of the continuing violations the-
ory implies that the majority realized the untenable nature of its decision
regarding the possibility of a continuing violation, yet it did not care, hold-
ing that "the concept of a continuing violation plainly is inconsistent with
our ultimate holding in this case."' 34 Havens helps illuminate where the
majority went wrong in its terse decision and why it should have found a
continuing violation.
In Havens, the Supreme Court gave deference to congressional intent
regarding the Fair Housing Act and took the opportunity to redefine what
constitutes a continuing violation when complaints of systemic discrimina-
tion are made:
a 'continuing violation' of the Fair Housing Act should be
treated differently from one discrete act of discrimination
133. Frame, 575 F.3d at 438.
134. Id.
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[i.e., what Ricks proscribes] . . . . Where the challenged vio-
lation is a continuing one, the staleness concern [of statutes
of limitations] disappears. Petitioners' wooden applica-
tion . .. ignores the continuing nature of the violation, only
undermin[ing] the broad remedial intent of Congress em-
bodied in the Act. 3 5
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the violation in systemic dis-
crimination cases was the policy of discrimination itself, and the continuing
existence of that policy amounted to a continuing violation.136
The same result should be reached in cases involving Title II of the
ADA such as Frame because the Fair Housing Act, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, and Title II of the ADA all have identical goals: to eliminate
discriminatory acts, policies, and practices directed at those who have tradi-
tionally been victims of discrimination.13 All three Acts were specifically
intended to address the social, economic, and psychological effects of dis-
crimination on members of groups that have been traditionally discrimi-
nated against.138 Additionally, discrimination in general - regardless of its
basis or form - stands in sharp contrast to fundamental constitutional prin-
ciples upon which our society is based.139 When he signed the ADA into
law, President Bush aptly alluded to the inharmonious relationship be-
tween discrimination and constitutional principles our society values: "[it
is altogether fitting that the American people have once again given clear
expression to our most basic ideals of freedom and equality. The [ADA]
represents the full flowering of our democratic principles[.]"1 40
Since the Civil Rights Act, the FHA, and the ADA were all designed
to eliminate discrimination that has traditionally hampered whole classes of
the population, logic - as well as judicial consistency - requires discrimina-
tory violation of all three Acts to necessarily be defined as systemic (that is,
continuing).' 4 ' It is an unwise notion that the failure to adequately main-
tain more than one hundred curb cuts and sidewalks throughout a metro-
politan area that an entire class of disabled people relies upon for mobility
is not systemic discrimination, especially considering that the Supreme
Court found nearly thirty years ago in Havens that, due to congressional
135. Havens, 455 U.S. at 380.
136. Thelma A. Crivens, The Continuing Violation Theory and Systemic Discrimination: In Search
of a Judicial Standard for Timely Filing, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1181 (1988).
137. See generally Crivens, supra note 136, for a discussion of the congressional goals in enacting
the Fair Housing Act and Civil Rights Act; see supra note 20 regarding the remedial goals of the ADA.
138. Id.
139. Crivens, supra note 136, at 1171-72.
140. "Statement by President George Bush upon Signing S. 933," supra note 17.
141. As noted in supra note 137, the Civil Rights Act shares the same remedial goals as the FHA
and ADA. While Morgan limited the applicability of the continuing violation theory in Title VII cases
(see supra note 29), it excluded the doctrine only where discrete, easily identifiable harm is concerned,
and it did not preclude its applicability to Title VII cases that allege systemic discrimination. Morgan,
536 U.S. at 109-10; see also Graham, supra note 28, at 304; see also Eve L. Hill & Peter Blanck, Future
of Disability Rights: Part Three, Statutes of Limitations in Americans with Disabilities Act "Design and
Construction Cases," 60 SYRACUSE L. REv. 125 (2009) (discussing the various ways courts have applied
the statute of limitations in cases such as Frame).
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intent, violations of the FHA can necessarily be defined as continuing.142 If
violations of the FHA are necessarily continuing, so should violations of
the ADA, as they both seek to redress systemic discrimination.
Additionally, the argument that finding a continuing violation in
Frame would subject the City to unlimited liability fails because after the
first suit the City would be required to fix the problem, thus eliminating the
possibility of future suits. The argument that cities do not have the funds to
make the updates that liability may mandate is also unfounded. In Jackson,
Mississippi, for instance, - a city well known for its budgetary issues - esti-
mation to bring its curbs into ADA compliance is under one-tenth of the
bond issue that would provide funding.1 43 Also, finding a continuing viola-
tion in suits such as Frame would facilitate the goals of Title II by requiring
the catalyst to actually bring curbs into compliance. Indeed, a suit similar
to Frame served as the catalyst for Memphis, Tennessee, to bring all of its
curbs into compliance with the ADA." Cities might actually even bring
curbs into compliance voluntarily to avoid the costs of potential litigation.
Accordingly, a more reasoned and consistent approach in Frame
would have been to adopt the reasoning in Havens and hold that the City's
chronic failure to make scores of curb cuts and sidewalks accessible to a
whole class of people dependent upon them is a combination of related
events that amount to systemic discrimination, and therefore necessarily a
continuing violation. As the plaintiffs had encountered at least one of the
noncompliant curbs or sidewalks within the applicable two-year statute of
limitations, the statute of limitations defense should not have succeeded.' 45
By not finding a continuing violation, the majority chose to grant what
amounts to limited liability to the City rather than reach a result that would
actually comport with clear congressional intent.
B. Ricks, Chardon, and their inapplicability to the facts of Frame
Ricks not only conflicts with prior congressional endorsement of case
law that granted "maximum coverage under the law" to plaintiffs in dis-
crimination suits,146 but it is also distinguishable from the Supreme Court's
later pronouncement in Havens discussed above, which involved systemic
discrimination and is thus more factually analogous to Frame. Ricks in-
volved a single act of discrimination directed at a single individual, and the
plaintiff had actual notice of his injury as well.'4 7 In fact, the only alleged
act of discrimination in Ricks was the actual notice of the plaintiff's denial
142. Havens, 455 U.S. at 380.
143. Joyner, supra note 131.
144. Id.
145. Br. of P1. in Resp. to Def.'s Third Renewed Mot. To Dismiss at 9, Frame v. City of Arlington,
No. 4-05CV-470-Y (N.D. Tex. 2008).
146. Crivens, supra note 136 at 1187 (citing B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI-
NATION LAw 236 (2d ed. 1983 & Supp. 1983-1984)).
147. Id. at 1191.
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of tenure. In such a situation, the rationale for applying the statute of limi-
tations is obvious, for a delay in filing suit could potentially harm the de-
fendant, and the plaintiff had concrete notice of his alleged injury.
Frame is not such a case, however. If the alleged violation in Frame is
not deemed continuing, it is at least clearly distinguishable from the alleged
violation in Ricks; in Frame, multiple plaintiffs were asserting that over one
hundred curb cuts and sidewalks throughout the City were non-compli-
ant. 148 As Judge Prado correctly noted in his dissent, "a denial of access is
not a later consequence of an injury but rather is the injury itself." 1 49 In
such a situation, statute of limitations concerns are nonexistent because the
alleged violation is not stale; it is undeniable that the noncompliant curb
cuts were not only inaccessible to disabled people during the two years
before the plaintiffs filed suit, but also are presently inaccessible.' 50
As previously noted, Frame is also distinguishable from Ricks and
Chardon with respect to notice. In Frame, the plaintiffs could not have
notice of the violations until they encountered each one, which is problem-
atic, given the fact that they were dependent upon other noncompliant curb
cuts and sidewalks for mobility. The lack of notice in Frame is arguably the
strongest reason not to apply the rationale of Ricks. In a case such as
Frame, potential plaintiffs are not always - in fact, they are hardly ever -
aware of specific failures of compliance with regards to curb cuts. The
most frequent failures in compliance are not known until the disabled per-
son actually tries to access the specific curb cut. It makes absolutely no
sense to require a suit to be brought within two years of construction of a
non-compliant curb if potential plaintiffs do not have notice of the curbs'
construction or alteration.
This is especially true since notice is intertwined with Article III stand-
ing. For instance, in 2007, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the general rule
that a plaintiff's claim does not accrue until the plaintiff is injured,"' and
the dissent in Frame cited a Fifth Circuit case from 2008 that stated: "the
limitations period begins to run 'the moment the plaintiff becomes aware
that he has suffered an injury or has sufficient information to know that he
has been injured."'1 5 2 Since under the ADA a plaintiff in the context of
Frame is not injured until he or she is actually excluded from use of curb
cuts and sidewalks, 5 the statute of limitations cannot begin to run until
the plaintiffs actually encountered the non-compliant curb cuts.
Using the majority's logic, many claims under the ADA- including
Frame - would have to be filed anticipatorily, as the plaintiffs may not have
even been injured within two years of non-compliant completion of a curb
cut. The fear of that result can be traced back to the dissents in Chardon
148. Frame, 575 F.3d at 433-34.
149. Id. at 445 (Prado, J., dissenting).
150. Supra note 145.
151. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007).
152. Frame, 575 F.3d at 442 (Prado, J., dissenting) (citing Walker v. Epps, 550 F.3d 407, 414 (5th
Cir. 2008) (quoting Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2001)).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2010).
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and Lorance, and the Supreme Court adopted those dissenters' views in
Bay Area Laundry.15 4 Additionally, the majority's logic effectively places a
burden on disabled people to search for newly constructed curb cuts in
order to timely file suit, which flies in the face of congressional intent. The
ADA was intended to relieve them from discrimination, not require them
to actively engage in the precise activity they are discriminatorily barred
from to timely file suit.
Section III highlighted how Ricks and Chardon have led to absurd and
conflicting results in various courts. There is evidence that courts see the
folly in Frame and will fail to follow it. In Eames, Jr. v. S. Univ. & Agric. &
Mech. Coll.,"' a factually similar case decided just three months after
Frame and within appellate jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit, the court held
that Frame did not apply and instead deferred to congressional intent, stat-
ing "[t]o find otherwise would destroy the requirement that governments
provide persons with disabilities 'meaningful access' to programs."" 5 6 Two
other district courts have also already found ways to distinguish Frame.'
Given the inconsistencies in courts' approaches in cases such as Frame,
however, action by the Supreme Court or Congress is necessary in order to
promote judicial consistency. The Supreme Court or Congress should soon
resolve the conflict and find that systemic discrimination such as that pre-
sent in Frame, if not a continuing violation, is analytically distinct from such
cases as Ricks and thus declare that the statute of limitations does not be-
gin to run until the plaintiffs are actually injured. An analysis of the wake
of Lorance and recent congressional action hopefully foreshadows just such
action by Congress.
C. Congressional response to Lorance and recent legislation as hopeful
predictions of swift Congressional action
As previously noted, the dissenter in Lorance correctly predicted con-
gressional backlash to the majority's decision to effectively grant seniority
systems the same immunity Frame recently gave the City through an adop-
tion of the reasoning in Ricks." He was not alone. As one commentator
noted, "[b]y reducing systemic discrimination to an individual practice oc-
curring at a precise moment, Lorance threatens to narrow the protection of
Title VII, and perhaps also of other federal civil rights laws."' 59 Unfortu-
nately, this commentator was right, and the Fifth Circuit expanded the
154. See supra Section III.
155. 2009 WL 3379070 (M.D. La. Oct. 16, 2009).
156. Id. at *3.
157. See Mosier v. Kentucky, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114699 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 9, 2009); see also
Californians for Disability Rights, Inc. v. Cal. DOT, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91490 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14,
2009).
158. Supra note 50.
159. Michael S. Vogel, The Remains of Tie VII After Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 22 COLUM.
Hum. R-rs. L. REv. 73, 76 (Fall 1990).
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scope of Lorance, holding that it applies to not only seniority cases but also
other types of cases.160 The commentator went on:
The inefficiency and injustice of Lorance can be addressed
to some extent by attempting to distinguish Lorance on its
facts, or by resorting to state law or other federal remedies.
These solutions, however, promise to address only a minor-
ity of labor discrimination cases affected by Lorance. Con-
gress must amend Title VII in a manner which restores the
act to its original effect.161
Fortunately, as previously mentioned, Congress amended the Civil Rights
Act to overrule the holding in Lorance regarding seniority systems.162
The same concerns are present after Frame, and their only remedy is
the same prescription. Just as in Lorance, the majority in Frame fails to
comport with clear congressional intent, much less traditional notions of
justice. Attempts, as some courts have, at distinguishing Ricks on its facts
will also only remedy a minority of Title II ADA cases and only further the
inconsistency with which the cases are handled. Fortunately, recent con-
gressional action suggests Congress may step in and legislatively reverse
decisions such as Frame.
On September 25, 2008 the 110th Congress enacted Public Law 110-
325, which amended the ADA "[t]o restore the intent and protections of
the American with Disabilities Act[.]"163 The amendment immediately evi-
dences congressional displeasure with results such as Frame, stating in its
first finding that "Congress intended that the Act 'provide a clear and com-
prehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities' and to provide broad coverage." 16 4 The
amendment further specifically cites two Supreme Court cases that "have
narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the
ADA. "165
Additionally, on January 29, 2009, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of
2009 was signed into law, which overturned Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co.166 In Ledbetter, a recent Supreme Court decision, the Court
held that in equal-pay lawsuits the statute of limitations began to run on
the date the pay was agreed upon rather than the date of the most recent
160. Barrow v. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n, 932 F.2d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that the reason-
ing from Lorance applied with equal force to a claim under the ADEA).
161. Supra note 159 at 95.
162. Supra note 52; see also Casteel v. Executive Bd. of Local 703 of Int'l. Broth. of Teamsters, 272
F.3d 463, 467 ("Lorance was abrogated when Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991[]").
163. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553 (2008).
164. Id. at § 2(a)(1).
165. Id. at § 2(a)(4).
166. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5, 5 (2009).
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check. 1 67 The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act reversed Ledbetter and estab-
lished that the statute of limitations resets with each new discriminatory
paycheck; specifically, the Act states that Ledbetter:
significantly impairs statutory protections against discrimi-
nation . . . that Congress established and that have been
bedrock principles of American law for decades. The Led-
better decision undermines those statutory protections by
unduly restricting the time period in which victims of dis-
crimination can challenge and recover for discriminatory
compensation decisions or other practices, contrary to the
intent of Congress.168
These recent, explicit actions by Congress clearly convey how it may
view Frame, which significantly narrowed the scope of Title II of the ADA
through a misapplication of the statute of limitations. Additionally, the
ADA Amendments Act of 2008 and the Lilly Ledbetter Act are hopefully
predictions that in the absence of judicial action Congress, as it did in the
aftermath of Lorance, will act to prevent the result reached by Frame from
recurring in the future.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is strange that the majority in Frame relied upon the reasoning in
Ricks to hold that the statute of limitations in ADA cases can run before
potential plaintiffs are injured, given that Ricks itself "recognize[d], of
course, that the limitations periods should not commence to run so soon
that it becomes difficult for a layman to invoke the protection of the civil
rights statutes."169 Additionally, it is clear that Congress did not enact the
ADA with the intention of allowing procedural labyrinths to effectively de-
stroy the very protections it sought to so extensively provide disabled
Americans.170 While a contrary holding was well-warranted in Frame, only
through the Supreme Court's decision that Ricks is distinguishable from
cases like Frame or an amendment to the ADA itself will courts consist-
ently reach results contrary to Frame. Hopefully just such action is soon to
come to fruition.
167. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 642-43 (2007).
168. Supra note 166 at § 2(1).
169. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 262.
170. See, e.g., Bethel v. Jefferson, 589 F.2d 631, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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